oriented NGOs, which began to flourish in Maluku during the 15 year reign of Emil Salim as Minister of Environment. While the second camp, which began more vocal during the 15-months Habibie presidency, prefer to use Islamic symbols as their identification marks.
Eventually, when Habibie lost the chance to legitimize his Suharto-derived position in the November 1999 presidential race, and the new president, Abdurrahman Wahid began to indicate his willingness to curtail the power of the military as well as the Suharto oligarchy, disgruntled factions within the military with the financial support of the Suharto oligarchy began to join forces, and calls for a holy war (jihad) between Muslims and Christians in Maluku, as well as the formation of jihad task forces, which were allowed to train openly with swords and in Arabic style dress, became the norm of the day.
At the moment, Maluku is the battleground where forces defending the entrenched military and economic interests in Indonesia are exploiting every single local ethnic and religious issue to delegitimize the current administration of Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri (Aditjondro, 2000b).
In this kind of situation, it could be expected that those who have repeatedly been accused of wanting to separate from the unitarian state of Indonesia, feel themselves being pushed into that corner. Looking at the current development in West Papua, where Tom Beanal, a former board member of the Indonesian Environmental Forum, who had taken the mining giant, Freeport McMoRan to court in the US, is now leading the umbrella group fighting for independence, it would not be surprising if in the near future, more young and old Ambonese are demanding independence from Indonesia.
This has nothing to do with their religion, since many young and old Achehnese, who have become disillusioned with the experience of 50 years joining the Republic of Indonesia, are now loudly calling for a UN-supervised referendum to fulfill their right to self-determination. Nobody can deny the strong Islamic belief of the Achehnese people. Neither can one deny the fact that many Riau intellectuals, who are now calling for an independent state, are practicing Muslims and therefore are disillusioned to see their natural resources enriching foreign multinationals and the Jakarta elite, while most of Riau's villagers are still living below the poverty line.
It is, on the contrary, the intolerance of the central government to respect the federalistic aspirations in Maluku, and even more so it is the intolerance of those who want to repress the deep feeling of dissatisfaction in Maluku by threatening them with a holy war, that is strengthening South Moluccan nationalism.
In other words, the Balkanization of Eastern Indonesia has already began, and increased troop deployments in Maluku as well as the 'religious apartheid' policy of Jakarta, is only a temporary solution, both for Indonesia as a whole as well as for Maluku in particular. A temporary solution, which is shamefully maintained by snipers, who keep shooting innocent victims from both side, each time the Moluccan people got tired of killing each other.
End Notes:
(1). I chose this term to replace the term 'race', which is an incorrect way of distinguishing the different ethnic groups in Indonesia.
(2). I find this myth also embedded by press reports about Indonesian politicians and generals, which state that "most Indonesians have only one name", e.g. Suharto, Wiranto, etc. This statement mystifies the fact that only Javanese of the older generation still use one name, and certainly not all Indonesian ethno-linguistic groups which use their clan name as family name. Even modern day Javanese -- including Suharto and Wiranto's children and grand-children -- are now using family names.
(3). A honours thesis by a former staff person of mine, Abner Korwa, shows how the canoe-building tradition of the Biak descendants on the Raja Ampat Islands, is influenced by canoe building techniques from North Maluku. Also, some maritime vocabulary among the coastal peoples of West Papua is derived from Maluku and even Sulawesi.
(4). Nusantara, which is a Sanskrit-Indonesian word for archipelago, is basically also what Indonesians call the archipelago where they live. It is a more neutral term than Indonesia, which refers more specifically to the political entity which is formally named the Unitarian State of the Republic of Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia ).
(5). The term Ambonese is popularly used for inhabitants of the Central Maluku islands of Ambon, Haruku, Saparua, Nusa Laut, and the big island of Ceram, which is believed to be the place of origins of all the Ambonese people. Hence, Ceram (Seram) is also called 'Nusa Ina', the mother island.
(6). Similar ethnic prejudice based on conflicting roles during colonial eras occur in Burma, with the Burman prejudice against the Christian Karen, who fought with the British colonial troops against the Buddhist Burman. Or in Vietnam, where Hmong hilltribes were used by the US occupation forces to fight the lowland Vietnamese freedom fighters.
(7). Other Indonesian ethnic groups, such as the Javanese and the Batak people from North Sumatra, were also well-represented in the KNIL. For instance, Suharto, Indonesia's second president, was formerly a KNIL sargeant, who moved to the Japanese-sponsored PETA paramilitary forces during the independence war. Or, T.B. Simatupang and A.H. Nasution, two former commanders of the Indonesian army, who did not go through the Japanese PETA period and directly moved into the Indonesian army (TNI).
(8). After the RMS rebellion on Ambon was crushed by TNI troops from Java, many of the former Ambonese KNIL families were evacuated by the Dutch
Eventually, when Habibie lost the chance to legitimize his Suharto-derived position in the November 1999 presidential race, and the new president, Abdurrahman Wahid began to indicate his willingness to curtail the power of the military as well as the Suharto oligarchy, disgruntled factions within the military with the financial support of the Suharto oligarchy began to join forces, and calls for a holy war (jihad) between Muslims and Christians in Maluku, as well as the formation of jihad task forces, which were allowed to train openly with swords and in Arabic style dress, became the norm of the day.
At the moment, Maluku is the battleground where forces defending the entrenched military and economic interests in Indonesia are exploiting every single local ethnic and religious issue to delegitimize the current administration of Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri (Aditjondro, 2000b).
In this kind of situation, it could be expected that those who have repeatedly been accused of wanting to separate from the unitarian state of Indonesia, feel themselves being pushed into that corner. Looking at the current development in West Papua, where Tom Beanal, a former board member of the Indonesian Environmental Forum, who had taken the mining giant, Freeport McMoRan to court in the US, is now leading the umbrella group fighting for independence, it would not be surprising if in the near future, more young and old Ambonese are demanding independence from Indonesia.
This has nothing to do with their religion, since many young and old Achehnese, who have become disillusioned with the experience of 50 years joining the Republic of Indonesia, are now loudly calling for a UN-supervised referendum to fulfill their right to self-determination. Nobody can deny the strong Islamic belief of the Achehnese people. Neither can one deny the fact that many Riau intellectuals, who are now calling for an independent state, are practicing Muslims and therefore are disillusioned to see their natural resources enriching foreign multinationals and the Jakarta elite, while most of Riau's villagers are still living below the poverty line.
It is, on the contrary, the intolerance of the central government to respect the federalistic aspirations in Maluku, and even more so it is the intolerance of those who want to repress the deep feeling of dissatisfaction in Maluku by threatening them with a holy war, that is strengthening South Moluccan nationalism.
In other words, the Balkanization of Eastern Indonesia has already began, and increased troop deployments in Maluku as well as the 'religious apartheid' policy of Jakarta, is only a temporary solution, both for Indonesia as a whole as well as for Maluku in particular. A temporary solution, which is shamefully maintained by snipers, who keep shooting innocent victims from both side, each time the Moluccan people got tired of killing each other.
End Notes:
(1). I chose this term to replace the term 'race', which is an incorrect way of distinguishing the different ethnic groups in Indonesia.
(2). I find this myth also embedded by press reports about Indonesian politicians and generals, which state that "most Indonesians have only one name", e.g. Suharto, Wiranto, etc. This statement mystifies the fact that only Javanese of the older generation still use one name, and certainly not all Indonesian ethno-linguistic groups which use their clan name as family name. Even modern day Javanese -- including Suharto and Wiranto's children and grand-children -- are now using family names.
(3). A honours thesis by a former staff person of mine, Abner Korwa, shows how the canoe-building tradition of the Biak descendants on the Raja Ampat Islands, is influenced by canoe building techniques from North Maluku. Also, some maritime vocabulary among the coastal peoples of West Papua is derived from Maluku and even Sulawesi.
(4). Nusantara, which is a Sanskrit-Indonesian word for archipelago, is basically also what Indonesians call the archipelago where they live. It is a more neutral term than Indonesia, which refers more specifically to the political entity which is formally named the Unitarian State of the Republic of Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia ).
(5). The term Ambonese is popularly used for inhabitants of the Central Maluku islands of Ambon, Haruku, Saparua, Nusa Laut, and the big island of Ceram, which is believed to be the place of origins of all the Ambonese people. Hence, Ceram (Seram) is also called 'Nusa Ina', the mother island.
(6). Similar ethnic prejudice based on conflicting roles during colonial eras occur in Burma, with the Burman prejudice against the Christian Karen, who fought with the British colonial troops against the Buddhist Burman. Or in Vietnam, where Hmong hilltribes were used by the US occupation forces to fight the lowland Vietnamese freedom fighters.
(7). Other Indonesian ethnic groups, such as the Javanese and the Batak people from North Sumatra, were also well-represented in the KNIL. For instance, Suharto, Indonesia's second president, was formerly a KNIL sargeant, who moved to the Japanese-sponsored PETA paramilitary forces during the independence war. Or, T.B. Simatupang and A.H. Nasution, two former commanders of the Indonesian army, who did not go through the Japanese PETA period and directly moved into the Indonesian army (TNI).
(8). After the RMS rebellion on Ambon was crushed by TNI troops from Java, many of the former Ambonese KNIL families were evacuated by the Dutch