and members of the mass organizations of the Indonesian Communist Party, PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia ), the central government's attitude towards Maluku changed radically. One by one, Sukarno's 'prestige projects' in Maluku, as the New Order liked to frame them, were dismantled and re-assembled on Java. The Wayame shipyard was moved to Surabaya, East Java, and became the Navy-controlled shipyard, PT PAL. The Makariki sugar mill was dismantled and re-installed at Jatiroto, also in East Java. Finally, the status of the Oceanography Institute in Ambon was reduced to become simply a station of the Jakarta-based National Oceanography Institute (LON) under the Indonesian Academy of Sciences. Construction of the institute's main laboratory in Ambon, which was previously a Soviet grant project, was discontinued (Aditjondro, 1990).
Next, instead of trying to please the Moluccans, Suharto-linked conglomerates began to feast on Maluku's abundant natural resources. The Banda Sea, abundant with its tuna fish, was at one stage leased out for 25 years to a Japanese fishing cooperative, which after 8 years was discontinued after numerous protests by local fisherfolks, environmentalists, and nationalists, who disagreed with the extent to which the Suharto regime seemed to please the Japanese creditors. This is when the Moluccan intelligentsia began to feel deprived and marginalized, becoming stepchildren of progress, and guests in their own house.
Nascent Moluccan nationalism, or to be more accurate, regionalist feeling began to emerge, and Ambonese intellectuals began to join environmental watchdog groups, after Suharto since 1978 began to push the environmental line to woo young campus radicals away from campus-based and Jakarta-oriented politics.
Unfortunately, what in Jakarta seemed to be well accepted, and was fully endorsed by Suharto's Minister of Environment, Emil Salim, was in the TNI-controlled province the opposite. Academics from the Pattimura University of Ambon, who assisted local villagers to defend their land rights vis-a-vis the powerful Djajanti Group, which was 10% owned by Suharto's cousin, Sudwikatmono, were arrested by the local military officers and accused of being RMS symphatizers (Fakta, July 15, 1988: 44, December 1, 1988: 47).(12)
In addition to the economic exploitation by the Suharto-linked forestry, fishery, cement and sago conglomerates, Maluku's wealth was also syphoned to Jakarta through the corruption of three consecutive military governors from Java (13) and the civil service.
However, corruption on provincial level was basically only the concern of the educated elite in Ambon, especially university-based idealists. What was more of concern to the local, grassroot Ambonese was the massive influx of settlers from other provinces, namely from Java, South Sulawesi, and Southeast Sulawesi. These much more entrepreneurial migrants began to dominate the city life, from the markets to the public transport. In addition, the numerous extractive industries that flourished in South and North Maluku also imported their workforce from Java, Lombok, and South Sulawesi. Consequently, with this massive influx of migrants, the religious Balance between Muslims and Christians in Ambon began to tip in favour of Muslims, a powder keg waiting to explode.
FROM the previous description of the cultural and economic oppression in Maluku, one can easily understand that these could only happen under strict military control by Jakarta. Apart from three consecutive governors which were appointed by Jakarta from the army, the Pattimura army command in Maluku was also under tutelage of the Brawijaya command of East Java. After Suharto was forced to step down by the student movement in Java, which were smartly manipulated by Ret. General Wiranto for his own political agenda, there was also hope for political and economic reform in Maluku. Following the steps of their comrades in Java, student activists in Maluku also became more militant in opposing corruption as well as the military's 'dual function' (dwifungsi) doctrine.
Unfortunately, General Wiranto who had been able to survive the transition from Suharto to Habibie, certainly was not willing to relinquish the military's power, especially with so many business links between military foundations and the Suharto family businesses.
Habibie, whom some expected to be more sensitive to the aspirations of the non-Javanese provinces, basically only catered for the aspirations of his own cronies from South Sulawesi. And, since with Suharto's blessing he had already built his power base among Muslim academics and bureaucrats who had joined his state-sanctioned association, ICMI, Habibie began to fill in as many governmental slots with his Muslim friends and followers.
This seems to be the spark that blew up the powder keg in Ambon, where the Christian intelligentsia began to see themselves as custodians of the grassroot, indigenous Ambonese and blamed their Muslim brothers for simply following the national, Muslim lines.
This conflict can also be seen as a centre-periphery conflict. Or, a conflict between the transformationists and the status quo defenders. The transformationists saw the future of Maluku in a federal Indonesia, with Jakarta devolving power to the states, without the involvement of the military in all walks of life and a return of the control of Maluku's resources to the traditional owners. On the other hand, those who defended the status quo saw that the existing system was already benefitting them and strongly defended the unitarian state and the role of the military in defending such kind of state.
Unfortunately, the first camp was more represented among Christian Moluccan intellectuals and the secular, more environmental and indigenous-rights
Next, instead of trying to please the Moluccans, Suharto-linked conglomerates began to feast on Maluku's abundant natural resources. The Banda Sea, abundant with its tuna fish, was at one stage leased out for 25 years to a Japanese fishing cooperative, which after 8 years was discontinued after numerous protests by local fisherfolks, environmentalists, and nationalists, who disagreed with the extent to which the Suharto regime seemed to please the Japanese creditors. This is when the Moluccan intelligentsia began to feel deprived and marginalized, becoming stepchildren of progress, and guests in their own house.
Nascent Moluccan nationalism, or to be more accurate, regionalist feeling began to emerge, and Ambonese intellectuals began to join environmental watchdog groups, after Suharto since 1978 began to push the environmental line to woo young campus radicals away from campus-based and Jakarta-oriented politics.
Unfortunately, what in Jakarta seemed to be well accepted, and was fully endorsed by Suharto's Minister of Environment, Emil Salim, was in the TNI-controlled province the opposite. Academics from the Pattimura University of Ambon, who assisted local villagers to defend their land rights vis-a-vis the powerful Djajanti Group, which was 10% owned by Suharto's cousin, Sudwikatmono, were arrested by the local military officers and accused of being RMS symphatizers (Fakta, July 15, 1988: 44, December 1, 1988: 47).(12)
In addition to the economic exploitation by the Suharto-linked forestry, fishery, cement and sago conglomerates, Maluku's wealth was also syphoned to Jakarta through the corruption of three consecutive military governors from Java (13) and the civil service.
However, corruption on provincial level was basically only the concern of the educated elite in Ambon, especially university-based idealists. What was more of concern to the local, grassroot Ambonese was the massive influx of settlers from other provinces, namely from Java, South Sulawesi, and Southeast Sulawesi. These much more entrepreneurial migrants began to dominate the city life, from the markets to the public transport. In addition, the numerous extractive industries that flourished in South and North Maluku also imported their workforce from Java, Lombok, and South Sulawesi. Consequently, with this massive influx of migrants, the religious Balance between Muslims and Christians in Ambon began to tip in favour of Muslims, a powder keg waiting to explode.
FROM the previous description of the cultural and economic oppression in Maluku, one can easily understand that these could only happen under strict military control by Jakarta. Apart from three consecutive governors which were appointed by Jakarta from the army, the Pattimura army command in Maluku was also under tutelage of the Brawijaya command of East Java. After Suharto was forced to step down by the student movement in Java, which were smartly manipulated by Ret. General Wiranto for his own political agenda, there was also hope for political and economic reform in Maluku. Following the steps of their comrades in Java, student activists in Maluku also became more militant in opposing corruption as well as the military's 'dual function' (dwifungsi) doctrine.
Unfortunately, General Wiranto who had been able to survive the transition from Suharto to Habibie, certainly was not willing to relinquish the military's power, especially with so many business links between military foundations and the Suharto family businesses.
Habibie, whom some expected to be more sensitive to the aspirations of the non-Javanese provinces, basically only catered for the aspirations of his own cronies from South Sulawesi. And, since with Suharto's blessing he had already built his power base among Muslim academics and bureaucrats who had joined his state-sanctioned association, ICMI, Habibie began to fill in as many governmental slots with his Muslim friends and followers.
This seems to be the spark that blew up the powder keg in Ambon, where the Christian intelligentsia began to see themselves as custodians of the grassroot, indigenous Ambonese and blamed their Muslim brothers for simply following the national, Muslim lines.
This conflict can also be seen as a centre-periphery conflict. Or, a conflict between the transformationists and the status quo defenders. The transformationists saw the future of Maluku in a federal Indonesia, with Jakarta devolving power to the states, without the involvement of the military in all walks of life and a return of the control of Maluku's resources to the traditional owners. On the other hand, those who defended the status quo saw that the existing system was already benefitting them and strongly defended the unitarian state and the role of the military in defending such kind of state.
Unfortunately, the first camp was more represented among Christian Moluccan intellectuals and the secular, more environmental and indigenous-rights