TNI, BRIMOB AND STATE TERROR IN THE MOLUCCAS

 

Suharto son-in-law says military 'capable' of creating unrest
AFP Tuesday, May 9 2000
Jakarta - Dissaffected Indonesian armed forcespersonnel, both active and retired, could be behind the political and social unrest in the country, a son-in-law of former president Suharto said Tuesday.

"Yes they are capable. But it's very difficult ... there (has) to be a very sophisticated investigation because we can't just accuse or believe (rumors) without proof," Prabowo Subianto told a press conference here.

Subianto, the former head of the Indonesia's crack Kostrad army strategic reserve command, was answering questions about an accusation by President Abdurrahman Wahid last week that groups, mostly of rogue ex-military personnel, were stirring up violence in the country.

But Subianto described the rumor of dissaffected officers being involved in the unrest as "very sensitive."

Since being abruptly discharged from the army after an inquiry into the kidnapping and deaths of political activists during the last months of Suharto's rule, Subianto has lived mainly in Jordan.

But he told the press conference that his Jordan-based business had now moved back to Jakarta, and he was spending more time in Indonesia.

The press conference was his first since his 1998 discharge.

"Anybody in this country is capable of formenting unrest," he said, adding that not "only the military" has the power and means to do so.

"Whether they are willing or want to, or motivated that's another matter ... but honestly I have to answer ... yes (they are capable)," he said.

To unearth the instigators, who were described by Wahid as "very smart," Subianto said "a professional and clean investigation is required."

"There must not be a vested interest, we also must not dismiss the possibility that foreign intelligence also took part in this," he added.

"I'm saying this is a very difficult matter, (and) this is the job of the intelligence service. We must have a professional and clean intelligence service to investigate this," he said, citing the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Singapore's Special Branch as examples.

Asked if the Wahid government's current effort to reduce the military's political role could motivate the rogue elements to incite violence, he replied: "If it's true then they are not patriots."

"I believe that a soldier must uphold the (interest) of the country. Frankly my generation and generations before me are the ones who would like to see the TNI out of politics," he said.

Prabowo also said the TNI's territorial doctrine -- which provides for military posts down to the sub-district level and which is scheduled to be scrapped gradually over the next few years -- was still "relevant."

"This doctrine is still relevant because it is the doctrine of an underdeveloped country and it is the weapon to face foreign enemies."

"Besides, in the next 20 or 30 years, I'm certain that our economy will not be sufficiently (developed) to buy sophisticated weapons such as submarines and jet fighters," he said.

Wiranto fans Ambon's flames
Sydney Morning Herald July 18, 2000
George Junus Aditjondro

The religious war between Christians and Muslims in Maluku (the Moluccas), which has taken anywhere between 3,000 and 10,000 lives in 18 months, is a tragedy that so far has not attracted much concern outside church circles in Australia.

This is despite the fact that in World War II, more than 1,100 Australian troops were sent to Ambon, the provincial capital, to oppose the Japanese invasion, and hundreds are buried in the war cemetery near the city's Pattimura University.

But the university was recently burned to the ground in a new invasion, when thousands of Jihad (Holy War) fighters sailed to Maluku with the tacit support of officers loyal to deposed armed forces chief General Wiranto, supposedly to "liberate" their brothers and sisters from "religious cleansing" by Christian Moluccans.

As happened in the post-referendum violence in East Timor, the inter-religious riots in Maluku which erupted in January 1999 were well planned by forcesloyal to ex-president Soeharto.

In this case, they initially had two goals. First, to destabilise one of the strongholds of Megawati Sukarnoputri, who was then the strongest presidential candidate to replace B.J. Habibie. Second, to create unrest in places where General Wiranto wanted to revive army regional commands . He did so four months after the violence flared in Ambon with the old Pattimura Command.

While the trouble in Ambon and the nearby islands continued, with more troops flown in, the old Maluku province was soon divided into the predominantly Muslim area of North Maluku, with its capital in Ternate, and the religiously balanced province of Maluku, with Ambon as its capital.

After using Ambonese gangsters as a smokescreen, paramilitary forces fuelled the killings and destruction by continuously creating casualties on both sides that cried for revenge.

Exhausted and saddened by the killings, Christian and Muslim leaders in Ambon repeatedly tried to make peace between the two groups. Repeatedly, however, two intelligence officers in the Pattimura Command, Colonel Budiatmo and Colonel Nono, made sure that peace could not be restored.

Colonel Budiatmo maintains links with the Christian militia in Ambon, while Colonel Nono maintains links with the Muslim militias, who are strengthened by the fighters from Java and South Sulawesi.

Two other interest groups are involved in maintaining the violence in Maluku. The first is made up of radical Muslims who oppose Mr Wahid's presidency and are financially backed by Fuad Bawazier, a former finance minister under Soeharto who is close to Mr Wahid's main nemesis, parliament speaker Amien Rais.

The second group consists of Indonesian business conglomerates which benefit from the troubles in Maluku by escaping their obligation to pay trillions of rupiahs owed to the Indonesian banks.

The first group had sent the Jihad fighters to Maluku. The bulk of these fighters are naive villagers who believe in the existence of an international Christian plot to dismantle the Indonesian Republic which, in their eyes, began with the liberation of East Timor. They are assisted by soldiers and deserters from the Indonesian military and police.

The second group consists of the Jayanti, Barito Pacific, Sinar Mas, and Artha Graha Groups which are closely linked to the Soeharto family. Two of these conglomerates, Jayanti and Sinar Mas, have close ties with Australian companies.

With officers loyal to General Wiranto entrenched in the armed forces, Mr Wahid and his deputy have their hands tied. Every time Soeharto or General Wiranto are interrogated, violence flares up in Maluku.
George Junus Aditjondro - Dept. of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Newcastle, Australia.
Copyright © 2000. The Sydney Morning Herald.

Army 'runs Indonesia'
Herald Sun June 6, 2002
The military (TNI) still holds the real political power in Indonesia, four years after the end of President Suharto's dictatorship, according to a former defence minister.

And soldiers will continue to run Indonesia for at least the next decade, predicts Yuwono Sudarsono, who was the country's first civilian defence minister.

"It's the only institution that's holding the country together," Mr Sudarsono said. "Despite its shortcomings, it's the most organised, the most disciplined."

Mr Sudarsono was part of the country's first democratically elected government under Abdurrahman Wahid and was responsible for reducing the role of the TNI in politics by pulling them out of government jobs.

But politicians have failed to take up the role of the military, particularly in the provinces, Mr Sudarsono said.

"(Now) there are 250 mini Suhartos around the country at various levels doing their own thing with no worry at all about being prosecuted," he said.

Analysts agree that since President Megawati Sukarnoputri rose to power almost a year ago, the impetus to remove the military from political life has waned.

Mr Sudarsono asserts that Mrs Megawati needs the political backing of the TNI's parliamentary representatives in order to be re-elected in 2004.
© Herald and Weekly Times.

New Violence in Indonesia's Ambon
International Crises Group
Jakarta/Brussels, 17 May 2004
The Indonesian government should give urgent priority to identifying and prosecuting the snipers responsible for dozens of deaths recently in Ambon, the site of bitter communal violence between 1999 and 2001, lest new killings disturb fragile Muslim-Christian peace as national elections approach.

In a briefing published today, Indonesia: Violence Erupts Again in Ambon*, the International Crisis Group notes that many who live in the Moluccan island city believe the violence that erupted on 25 April, the anniversary of a short-lived Republic of the South Moluccas that tried to break away from Indonesia in 1950, was provoked. Two-thirds of some 40 people killed were Muslim, most shot to the head, neck, or chest. (Others died of machete wounds.) An additional 200, Muslims and Christians alike, were wounded, and close to 10,000 people were displaced.

The shootings took place after members of the pro-independence Front for Moluccan Sovereignty (known by its Indonesian initials FKM) held a ceremony at the house otheir group's exiled founder, Alex Manuputty, on the morning of 25 April. FKM, a largely Christian organisation, sees itself as continuing the struggle for the Republic of the South Moluccas. Manuputty had been detained on rebellion charges, but late last year, was released on a technicality and fled to the United States.

"The failure of the local police to prepare adequately for the 25 April commemorations was clearly a factor in this outbreak", said Robert Templer, ICG's Asia Program Director, "but the key questions are who were the snipers, and why did they open fire?" Those questions need to be answered in a thorough, transparent, and impartial investigation, or the risk of another round of violence will be serious.

ICG discounts the government's quick presumption that the gunmen belonged to FKM or radical Muslim groups. The former have no sniper capacity, the latter would not have aimed at members of their own community. Much speculation has focused on members or ex-members of the security forces, who would have the necessary marksmanship. But no hard evidence at this stage supports any of the conspiracy theories that link the killings to the national presidential elections later this summer or local police-military rivalry.

The new ICG paper looks at how the violence began, the missteps made by officials in addressing it, and the different theories that have emerged to explain it. "The richness of the conspiracy theories is equalled by the paucity of hard facts", said Templer. "The longer the snipers remain unidentified, the greater the chance of a new round of violence in a sensitive place and at a sensitive time for Indonesia's democracy".

Contacts: Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) +32 (0) 485 555 946
Jennifer Leonard (Washington) +1-202-785 1601
Read the report in full on our website: http://www.icg.org/

Indonesia: Violence Erupts Again in Ambon
Asia Briefing N°32
17 May 2004
OVERVIEW

The city of Ambon, in Maluku (Moluccas), which had been relatively quiet for two years, erupted in violence on 25 April 2004 after a small group of independence supporters held a ceremony commemorating the 54th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of the South Moluccas (Republik Maluku Selatan, RMS).

As of 5 May, the death toll had reached 38, about two-thirds of whom were Muslim. The fact that many were killed by sniper fire has led to a widespread belief that the violence was provoked. Two churches, a Muslim high school, the office of UN humanitarian agencies, and hundreds of homes were set on fire. Close to 10,000 people have been displaced from their homes, adding to the some 20,000 displaced during earlier phases of the conflict who remain unable to return to their original dwellings. Until 5 May, the deaths and arson had been confined to Ambon city; religious and community leaders had kept many previously hard-hit communities elsewhere on the island and in the central Moluccan archipelago from exploding, a tribute to the reconciliation efforts over the last two years. But that day, gunmen killed two people on Buru island, and there have subsequently been isolated outbreaks elsewhere, although the city itself has returned to a tense calm. The longer it takes to uncover the perpetrators of this latest round of violence, the greater the danger of a new eruption.

The response of the Indonesian government at both local and national levels has been poor, from the short-sightedness of the police to the unhelpful portrayal of the violence in some quarters as Christian independence supporters against Muslim defenders of national unity. That said, the violence has been largely contained. What is needed now is a thorough, impartial, professional, and transparent investigation into the causes.

But as the Jakarta Post editorialised on 6 May, events in Ambon may be part of a larger political game. The question as the 5 July presidential elections approach is whether anyone benefits by making trouble there. As usual, conspiracy theorists have been hard at work, and as usual, hard evidence is in extremely short supply.
Jakarta/Brussels, 17 May 2004

Analysis: Community-based military surveillance returns to Indonesia
By : Dr. Jim Schiller
channelnewsasia.com
27 October 2005
The Indonesian government plans to revive a community-based intelligence system run by the military.

Known locally as Koter, the system was scrapped after the fall of former President Suharto, but it has gained new support following the Bali bombings.

The system allows thousands of non-commissioned officers to act as the government’s eyes and ears at the village level in their search for terrorists.
The Presidential office noted that Koter was the only security mechanism available in the country to enable the government "to detect security threats in far-away places, in villages, and in places where the government has no access."

However, human rights activists worry that reintroducing such surveillance systems might lead to military repression amongst the communities across the republic.

How can the Indonesian government strengthen its counter-terrorism fight while ensuring the rights of its citizens are not violated?

Justin Teo spoke to Dr. Jim Schiller, an Indonesian specialist at the School of Political and International Studies at Flinders University in Australia, for more.

JS: Well, it’s always a delicate balance in trying to do that. I don’t think it’s an easy thing to do at all. I think the Indonesian government needs to be doing something, it needs to be seen to be doing something against terrorism. And the reestablishment of the local intelligence network at the village level is a natural part of that process.

JT: Could the strong political backing to reintroduce the intelligence network in communities be a response to the lack of progress hampering anti-terrorism investigations after the recent Bali bombings?

JS: It’s probably a public relations exercise to be seen to be doing something. I think the government is committed to do something because they need to go on and continue to have successful economic ties with the West and investment in Indonesia. So they want to be seen to be doing something and this is something which they can do which is not a major step.

JT: How much difference will this intelligence network give the Indonesian government in its anti-terrorism efforts?

JS: I think it formalizes a system that’s already there. In Indonesia, these NGOs which operate at the village level have been there since the 1960s. So now they are formalizing the process to make the movement of information up the chain from the village to the centres of command more efficient. But I don’t know it that is going to happen very quickly.

JT: There is still a deep mistrust between Indonesians and their military. Could this community intelligence network be carried out by the police instead?

JS: I’m sure that the police do have their own intelligence network as well. However, it’s not as well established as the military one. Yes, it might make more sense to have one done by the police than the military but the police do not have a very good reputation in Indonesia either.

JT: Even if this community-based intelligence network is revived by the military, could it lead to conflicts between the Indonesian army and the police instead of fostering closer ties?
JS: I don’t see an immediate, very large effect on that. The problem for the military is that they are demoralized because they have lost a lot of the power which they once had, when their political activities were taken away from them and their security activities were taken away by the police. So there is still room for conflict between the army and police because the police is seen to be having greater access to resources than the military.

JT: How much pressure is the Indonesian government facing from the international community to be more effective in its fight against terrorism?

JS: I think quite a lot. They are under heavy pressure not just from its ASEAN neighbors but also from the United States and its allies. I think that the Indonesian government is reasonably committed to the process. The government knows that it’s not as strong as an autocratic government. It’s now a democratic government and its power is more divided in society than it was once before. And there are some major Muslim organizations that see the crackdown on terror as being making Indonesia as a subservient nation, a quiet nation, to the United States. So they don’t want that to happen. So the government is forced to take someaction and but it also needs to be careful in what it does, and not upset its own political balance in Indonesia. - RSI Dr. Jim Schiller, an Indonesian specialist at the School of Political and International Studies at Flinders University in Australia.
Copyright © 2005 MCN International Pte Ltd


101 East looks at the human rights record of Indonesia's anti-terror police unit BRIMOB

AlJazeera 101 East - BRIMOB - 25 Oct 07 - Part 1
http://nl.youtube.com/watch?v=x1_uAbI-JBQ&feature=related

AlJazeera 101 East - BRIMOB - 25 Oct 07 - Part 2
http://nl.youtube.com/watch?v=9ahcBGiw3C4&feature=related

 

The armed forces continue to foment violent outbreaks and exacerbate crises around Indonesia to justify their special role.

 

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Indonesia maintains a strong military presence in its eastern province of Maluku [EPA] (Aljazeera)
FRIDAY, APRIL 04, 2008 11:38 MECCA TIME,
8:38 GMT

 

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Troops have taken sides, say eyewitnesses

 

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TV footage shows soldiers fighting alongside militants of Laskar Jihad

 

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Army accused over Moluccas conflict

BBC News July 17, 2000

New evidence that the Indonesian security forces are providing support for militant groups has emerged in television footage from the Moluccan islands.

The pictures appear to show soldiers in uniform fighting alongside Muslim militants on the island of Ambon, during an upsurge in violence between Christians and Muslims over the weekend.

The fighting has left at least 20 people dead on Ambon in the past two days, despite the imposition of a state of emergency.

On Monday, Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid said he would consider requesting international assistance if the violence in the Moluccas continued, but stressed it would be logistical rather than military help.

"If we cannot manage any more, we may cry for support from abroad in logistics and equipment ... not more than that," the president said.

Automatic weapons

BBC Jakarta correspondent Richard Galpin says the newly released TV footage provides incontrovertible evidence that elements within the security forces are providing support for the militants - something that has long been suspected.

The Muslim militants, known as the Laskar Jihad, are also seen for the first time to be using automatic weapons, apparently supplied by the army.

Some carried the Indonesian-made SS-1, a version of a Belgian-made automatic rifle which is only available to the army.

Indonesian Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono on Saturday accused rogue army officers of provoking the clashes.

He said the officers concerned were an "uncontrollable factor" in the violence, but said he was powerless to force their sacking.

Senior government officials have blamed the violence on supporters of former President Suharto, who are seeking to destabilise President Abdurrahman Wahid's government.

Another possibility is that members of the security forces are becoming polarised along the lines of their own religious affiliation.

Death toll

Hospital officials said that seven Christians and 13 Muslims died in the weekend's fighting.

Among the dead were a pregnant mother and her daughter, killed when a mortar round was fired into their home.

Shops and homes were burned and looted.

At least 3,000 people have been killed and 500,000 left homeless since sectarian violence broke out 18 months ago between the islands' Muslim and Christian communities.

Many of the militants - 10,000 according to some accounts - have arrived from other islands in recent months, and say their only aim is to defend the Muslim community on Ambon.
BBC © MMVIII

TNI accused of imposing martial law 'by stealth' in Maluku

The Jakarta Post May 30, 2002
Yogita Tahilramani

The appointment of Maj. Gen. Djoko Santoso to lead security restoration operations in the troubled Maluku province points to clear domination of the military there and a tactful admission by the Indonesian Military (TNI) that it will not submit to orders issued by the police or civilians, including Governor Saleh Latuconsina, a sociologist said on Wednesday.

Thamrin Amal Tomagola of the University of Indonesia said that Djoko's appointment as commander of the security restoration operations, aside from heading the Pattimura Regional Military Command in Maluku, indicated that with skillful engineering, the TNI had managed to impose martial law by stealth. This followed the restructuring of security authorities in which the TNI has been assigned by the Indonesian government to lead the day-to-day security operations in Maluku.

"TNI wanted to impose martial law but since this was strongly rejected by the Ambonese public and legislators, they engineered the situation in such a way that the TNI instead set up a new security command body ... even if it is a civil emergency status there, it is in now in effect martial law," Thamrin told The Jakarta Post over the phone from Bali.

He said that the appointment of a military general to lead the new security command was in contradiction with the law.

Similarly, human rights activist Munir said on Wednesday that the formation of a new security command in Maluku, goes against all existing regulations, including Law No. 23/1959 on the state of emergency, which clearly stipulates that police are the front-line authority during a civil emergency status.

Minister of Home Affairs Hari Sabarno firmly denied on Wednesday that the government's decision had in turn allowed the TNI to impose martial law by stealth.

According to MPR Decree No. 7 on the role of the Indonesian Military and the National Police, the police are in charge of security, while the military is in charge of defense matters and, when necessary, will back up the police.

Thamrin, however, doubted that the TNI would comply with the instructions issued by the Maluku civil emergency authorities.

"The main problem ... that the TNI will not bow before the governor's orders or instructions, remains. Even though (Army chief) Gen. Endriartono Sutarto gave his word that TNI will follow orders issued by Governor Latuconsina, I seriously doubt it. When a military brigadier general did not follow the governor's orders, why should a major general do so?" Thamrin asserted.

Thamrin advised that Governor Latuconsina refrain from issuing orders behind doors in closed meetings with local military and police chiefs, and should instead make his orders known to the legislators and the general public.

"This way ... he will not be made a pawn by military or police chiefs. He instead should lobby for support from legislators and the general public by first making public all orders he issues," Thamrin said.

Djoko was appointed on Tuesday to lead the security restoration operations and head the Pattimura Regional Military Command in Maluku. He replaced Brig. Gen. Mustopo as the Pattimura Regional Military Commander, who will be transferred to another post at Army Headquarters.

Separately, the National Police insisted on Wednesday that the appointment of a military general did not render the police "inferior".

"The National Police were involved in the making of this decision in meetings led by Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. It was a necessary security measure. The police and the military will try to restore security in Maluku at any cost and if the command is being led by a military general ... then the police too are not that inflexible that they cannot accommodate such a decision," National Police deputy spokesman Brig. Gen. Edward Aritonang told the Post on Wednesday.

Meanwhile, National Police spokesman Insp. Gen. Saleh Saaf added that there was a "50-50 chance" that Maluku Police chief Brig. Gen. Soenarko would be replaced as well in the coming days.
Copyright © 2002The Jakarta Post

Partners in crime

Sydney Morning Herald November 2, 2002

They are our new allies in the war against terrorism. But Indonesia's military and security agencies seem more intent on fighting each other for economic spoils than tracking down extremists. Hamish McDonald and Matthew Moore report.

Early this week, a military attache with a Western embassy in Jakarta was given a tip-off by senior officers in Indonesian armed forces headquarters: the head of the counter-terrorism unit with the Indonesian army's special forces had been identified as a source of the explosives used in the October 12 bombings in Bali.

The attache and other defence analysts quickly identified what this was all about: discrediting the father-in-law of the officer mentioned, who happens to be retired general A.M. Hendropriyono, the head of the state intelligence agency, or BIN, which is eclipsing the military role in anti-terrorism.

That such a transparent piece of disinformation could be attempted at relatively high levels of the military - and be met with a ho-hum reaction by its recipients - testifies to an astonishing level of credulity here about what agencies of the state are capable of doing.

One conspiracy theory after another has hit the media or circulated around the Jakarta elite this week.

One front-page story had two prominent generals as masterminds of the Bali bombings. Another theory pointed to former defence minister General Wiranto. On Wednesday, US ambassador Ralph Boyce had to fend off renewed questioning from local reporters suggesting the CIA had a hand in the attack.

On Thursday, newspapers quoted police chief General Da'i Bachtiar raising suspicions about separatists in remote Aceh province.

Way down the list of suspects, it seems, are the organisations that Western governments most strongly suspect: Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda terrorist group from the Middle East, and Jemaah Islamiah, a similar-minded local group of radical Islamists who aspire to create a pan-Islamic state including all believers in South-East Asia.

Indonesians don't know much about these two groups. The first is remote from their experience, the second a fringe group with outlandish ideas. But Indonesians do know about their own military, police and intelligence agencies, which is why these conspiracy theories fly.

Over decades, Indonesians have seen their security agencies stage all kinds of provocations and fake terrorist incidents for political ends. They also know them to be deeply corrupt.

The country has opened up immensely since the 1998 fall of former president Soeharto, whose authoritarian rule has been replaced by election-based politics. But the security forces remain their own masters and, in the eyes of many critics, continue to foment violent outbreaks and exacerbate crises around Indonesia to justify their special role.

The armed forces, or TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia), still largely fund themselves from a mix of legal and illegal business activities that raise an estimated $6.4 billion a year, as against their funding from the Government budget of only $3.2 billion. TNI-controlled "charitable foundations" run 64 companies in everything from shopping centres to airlines to logging, while the army, navy and air force have their own empires. But by far the most lucrative are protection payments paid by private enterprises, from huge resource companies down to criminals behind gambling, drugs and prostitution.

This wasn't such a security problem until Soeharto's fall. Since then, the military's grip on its cash flow has been challenged from other quarters.

The police, previously run as the fourth branch of the armed forces, were taken out of the Defence Department and put under civilian control two years ago. While the military have been left with their network of domestic garrisons known as the Territorial Command structure, a new law also gives the police responsibility for internal security - without extra funding or resources.

Another major change has been the devolution of political authority from Jakarta to the 30 provinces and 400 local governments, which have gained direct access to much of the tax revenue from mining and timber. Alongside the power and funds, corruption and extortion have also been decentralised.

The result is that police and army units are now fighting for control of protection rackets and other sources of income across the country.

Last month, at Binjai in North Sumatra, an army airborne unit tied up its officers and attacked two local police stations using rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons, killing eight police and civilians, in a squabble over 1.5 tonnes of cannabis. On the eastern island of Flores, police and the army have battled repeatedly in the streets of the main city, Maumere. Protection money has emerged as a possible motive for the attack on 10 teachers at the American-owned Freeport Mine in Papua in August, in which two Americans and one Indonesian died.

According to Marcus Mietzner, a German scholar researching the Indonesian military for a doctorate at the Australian National University, some companies are paying protection money to as many as 14 groups, including army, police, ethnic militias and the "security units" or Satgas attached to political parties.

"It has become a very crowded protection sector," Mietzner said. "This is why they are getting more and more desperate and why they are crossing lines they have not crossed before. Why they are killing police officers and probably even foreigners."

This doesn't mean that the security forces would carry out a giant atrocity like the Bali bombings. For one thing, Mietzner points out, the military has direct investments in Bali like the giant Nusa Dua resort, hotels and golf courses, as well as extracting protection money from other tourism operators.

For another, the TNI is no longer under threat from the reform push that two years ago seemed likely to wind up the territorial commands. That pressure has all but vanished since the TNI-friendly Megawati Soekarnoputri took over the Indonesian presidency in August last year and the September 11 attacks made the US worry more about security than human rights or corruption.

"There is little reason for the TNI to be dissatisfied with the current situation," Mietzner says. "Everything [has been] going their way."

But it does mean that the Indonesian security apparatus is not much of a barrier to serious terrorists. A determined terrorist with enough money can buy his way in and out of the country and acquire all the explosives and weapons he needs.

The security forces are also in disarray at the top. With vacillating leadership from President Megawati and her top security minister, former general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the chiefs of the various security agencies are busy competing for control of the massive investigation to catch the Bali bombers.

As well as the police team working with the Australian Federal Police, FBI and other foreign experts in Bali, separate investigations are being run by BIN's civilian intelligence agents and by the army intelligence arm called BAIS.

Throughout the investigation, they have made wildly conflicting claims about their progress. BIN's spokesman claimed a week ago that the agency knew the identity of three of the 10 suspected bombers, a claim the police said was a mystery to them.

Since the bombings, the Howard Government has said it wants closer contact with Indonesian security. The US Government has said the same. The problem is that many of the Indonesian security chiefs have themselves organised large-scale violent activities, such as the "Laskar Jihad" (Holy War Warrior) campaign against Christian communities in eastern Indonesia and the anti-independence militias in East Timor.

The unit best prepared for anti-terrorism duty is the notorious army special forces command known as Kopassus, responsible for extensive assassinations of government opponents.

"Any government that sees the TNI or indeed BIN as a solution to the terrorist problem has got to look really carefully at what these people have done in the past, and what they may be doing now," says Sidney Jones, Indonesia director of the International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based privately funded monitoring body.

Since BIN handed over the wanted al-Qaeda operative Omar al-Faruq to the CIA in June, American officials have seemed prepared to overlook the controversial career of BIN chief Hendropriyono.

This week's presidential decree making BIN the co-ordinator of counter-terror operations - involving personnel from each armed service, police and the allegedly less-tainted Unit 81 of Kopassus - may open the way for foreign forces to bypass the politically untouchable Kopassus.

But experts such as Mietzner call this a "quick fix" which will achieve very little. He argues the only way to lift the quality of Indonesia's security forces is to address the problem of military finances, by insisting on full transparency and accountability and possibly considering international aid for the transition.

That may be a multi-billion-dollar program. But as long as the TNI is selffunded, it is outside the Indonesian Government's control and inherently corruptible, and there will continue to be a huge gap in the region's security.

"If you just pump money and resources into the existing system you just perpetuate what is already there," says Mietzner.

for more articles related to: Army accused over Moluccas conflict see Archive

the politically untouchable Wiranto

 

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WIRANTO -  BODIES POINT TO HIM

www.nicholsoncartoons.com.au.

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