continuation of
LIBERATING OUR COLONIAL MINDSET
If we still have serious disagreements on all those eight points, we have to ask ourselves, what are then the substantive differences between the "colonial" Dutch East Indies and the "independent" Indonesia? Or is Indonesia only a "new society" in an "old state" ? Or in a more popular language, old wine in a new bottle ?
Contemporary Challenges
This leads us then into the contemporary challenges, which are the legacy as well as the "hang-overs" of the 1945-1950 independence struggle:
(I). Defining who we are as a nation-state: is Indonesia a continuation of the former East Indies Dutch colony, a completely new nation-state in the making, or a newborn Java-based empire (Majapahit, or Mataram)?
(II). Defining whom do we consist of as citizens of that nation-state: are we a multiracial and multicultural agglomeration of peoples ? Or are we a single people (satu bangsa) undergoing a process of homogenization under a dominant culture, a dominant religion, and a dominant state philosophy ?
(III). Defining the means with which we rule ourselves: are we going to allow ourselves to be ruled continuously by a homogenizing and self-serving elite, which glorify the supremacy of the armed resistance in the independence struggle to legitimize civilian domination by the military as well as to justify the collusion of the former freedom fighters with their Chinese gun-runners ? Or, do we have to create a completely new Government ethos?
If the latter is the case then we have to demystify the glorification of the ksatria -- or warrior -- culture that is believed to have kept us intact as a nation from various external threats, by exploring other contributing factors which have lead us to (political) independence, as well as exploring other strands in the independence struggle which did not make it.
For instance, we have to explore the "100% merdeka" strand of Tan Malaka, which aimed at political independence from a "foreign" power with the liberation of the people from their own political and economic oppressors, who had been the agents of Dutch colonialism. We also have to explore the more peaceful means of liberating the masses from poverty and isolation from the global community through education, health and economic efforts, which were endeavoured by Muhammadiyah, Taman Siswa, and other civilian organizations. In the mean time, we also have to explore and appreciate the independence fighters on the diplomatic front, and not continuously blame them for yielding too easily to the Dutch demands, as we often read from the literature written by contemporary dwi-fungsi aplogists for the Indonesian regime.
Now, if we do not glorify the armed resistance in the independence struggle, and see their role as important as the peaceful resistance through economic and diplomatic means, then we should also terminate the collusion of business and politics, the "illegitimate child" (anak haram) of the armed guerilla struggle, (11) especially since it deprives the majority of the Indonesian and East Timorese peoples from the full benefits of the Indonesian revolution.
My answers to those questions are probably already obvious for those who are aware of my political trajectory under the New Order regime, having experienced major shifts in the nation's political culture, and having personally grown up -- biologically as well as intellectually -- in Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Irian Jaya, the Netherlands, the USA, and currently in Australia.
First of all, I do not see Indonesia as the rightful heir and thereby a continuation of the Dutch East Indies, nor as a newborn Java-based empire. Indonesia is becoming, as well as will become, what its peoples wanted it to become, even if that means a reformulation of the old Dutch East Indies borders -- which have already been violated -- with the consent of most Indonesian intellectuals, since 1975.
Secondly, the Indonesian society as I see it, should not be seen as a single people, but as an agglomeration of peoples, consisting of different races, different ethno-linguistic groups, different historical heritages, different religious and political convictions, who all strive for the right to be treated as citizens with equal rights before the law. Hence, the 1945 constitutional limitation that only "indigenous" Indonesians could become president should be abolished. Likewise, standard practices or the current predominant belief that only Muslim Javanese military males could even be considered as candidates for the presidency, should also be abolished.
Thirdly, Indonesia's citizens and residents should have the right to be ruled by a civilian government, with maximum protection against the collusion between business (private) and public interests, a government which is accountable to the citizens through periodical elections as well as through unperiodical referenda in matters which effect the public welfare.
Conclusion
Finally, as a way of conclusion, allow me to paraphrase from Albert Memmi's classic (12), which I think it quite appropriate to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Indonesia's attempt to become an independent nation-state:
. . .colonization materially kills the colonized. It also kills him or her spiritually. Colonization distorts relationships, destroys or petrifies institutions, and corrupts men and women, both colonizers and colonized. To live, the colonized needs to do away with colonization. To become a man or woman, he or she must do away with the colonized being that he or she has become. If the European must annihilate the colonizer within himself or herself, the colonized must also rise above his or her colonized being.
So the question arises then: after fifty years, have we as Indonesians risen above our colonized being, or have we bcome colonizers ourselves ? Not only colonizers of another people who did not share the same historical heritage as us, but also as colonizers of our own peoples ?
Fremantle, August 15, 1995
Footnotes
(1) In fact, these are the legal instruments which the "New Order" is actually using more and more to crack down on dissidents from all walks of life in Indonesia, recently -- trade unionists, journalists, academics, etcetera.
(2) There is a strong pro-Java & Sumatra bias in the Anglophone Indonesian historiography, especially the focus on the era of the Indonesian modern independence struggle. One tends to forget, that the Makassarese of Gowa were only pacified, through the Bongaya treaty, in 1905. Apart from Eastern Indonesia, the independence struggle carried out in Kalimantan has also been overlooked by many Anglophone historians. This bias is probably caused by the fact that many of the East Indonesian and Kalimantan independence fighters, such as Kahar Muzakkar, Andi Mattalata, Sam Ratulangie and his daughter, Zus Ratulangie, and Tjilik Riwut, began their struggle from the bases in Java, due to the colonial centralistic state in Java, before eventually moving to their places of origin. The late Tjilik Riwut commanded the Air Force and Navy units which attacked the Dutch military posts in South and Central Kalimantan. because of his close connections with Sukarno, who was also an admirer of the Air Force, he was later appointed as the first governor of Central Kalimantan, one of the three Dayak governors before a series of Javanese governors ruled Central Kalimantan, until now.
(3) We should not forget that during the BPKI debates, some of the founding fathers of the Indonesian Republic also opted for a federalistic state, namely Mohammad Hatta and GSSJ (Sam) Ratulangie. They were overruled by the majority of the BPKI members, which were obviously so much obsessed with unity, that they feared federalistic state would certainly work in favour of the Dutch divide and rule tactics.
(4) Currently, democracy stirs have already become stronger in this Malay Muslim monarchy, which Azahari and his Partai Ra'yat Brunei wanted to reform in the early 1960s. However, PRB is still banned and recently its former executive secretary, Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, has been detained. Hence, another light needs to be put on this aborted revolution, instead of putting PRB -- and especially its former chairperson and founder, Azahari -- simply as a "puppet" of Sukarno's expansionistic dreams to take over the former British colonies of Northern Borneo. For a better picture of this aborted revolution and its aspirations, see Zaini Haji Ahmad's book, Partai Rakyat
Contemporary Challenges
This leads us then into the contemporary challenges, which are the legacy as well as the "hang-overs" of the 1945-1950 independence struggle:
(I). Defining who we are as a nation-state: is Indonesia a continuation of the former East Indies Dutch colony, a completely new nation-state in the making, or a newborn Java-based empire (Majapahit, or Mataram)?
(II). Defining whom do we consist of as citizens of that nation-state: are we a multiracial and multicultural agglomeration of peoples ? Or are we a single people (satu bangsa) undergoing a process of homogenization under a dominant culture, a dominant religion, and a dominant state philosophy ?
(III). Defining the means with which we rule ourselves: are we going to allow ourselves to be ruled continuously by a homogenizing and self-serving elite, which glorify the supremacy of the armed resistance in the independence struggle to legitimize civilian domination by the military as well as to justify the collusion of the former freedom fighters with their Chinese gun-runners ? Or, do we have to create a completely new Government ethos?
If the latter is the case then we have to demystify the glorification of the ksatria -- or warrior -- culture that is believed to have kept us intact as a nation from various external threats, by exploring other contributing factors which have lead us to (political) independence, as well as exploring other strands in the independence struggle which did not make it.
For instance, we have to explore the "100% merdeka" strand of Tan Malaka, which aimed at political independence from a "foreign" power with the liberation of the people from their own political and economic oppressors, who had been the agents of Dutch colonialism. We also have to explore the more peaceful means of liberating the masses from poverty and isolation from the global community through education, health and economic efforts, which were endeavoured by Muhammadiyah, Taman Siswa, and other civilian organizations. In the mean time, we also have to explore and appreciate the independence fighters on the diplomatic front, and not continuously blame them for yielding too easily to the Dutch demands, as we often read from the literature written by contemporary dwi-fungsi aplogists for the Indonesian regime.
Now, if we do not glorify the armed resistance in the independence struggle, and see their role as important as the peaceful resistance through economic and diplomatic means, then we should also terminate the collusion of business and politics, the "illegitimate child" (anak haram) of the armed guerilla struggle, (11) especially since it deprives the majority of the Indonesian and East Timorese peoples from the full benefits of the Indonesian revolution.
My answers to those questions are probably already obvious for those who are aware of my political trajectory under the New Order regime, having experienced major shifts in the nation's political culture, and having personally grown up -- biologically as well as intellectually -- in Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Irian Jaya, the Netherlands, the USA, and currently in Australia.
First of all, I do not see Indonesia as the rightful heir and thereby a continuation of the Dutch East Indies, nor as a newborn Java-based empire. Indonesia is becoming, as well as will become, what its peoples wanted it to become, even if that means a reformulation of the old Dutch East Indies borders -- which have already been violated -- with the consent of most Indonesian intellectuals, since 1975.
Secondly, the Indonesian society as I see it, should not be seen as a single people, but as an agglomeration of peoples, consisting of different races, different ethno-linguistic groups, different historical heritages, different religious and political convictions, who all strive for the right to be treated as citizens with equal rights before the law. Hence, the 1945 constitutional limitation that only "indigenous" Indonesians could become president should be abolished. Likewise, standard practices or the current predominant belief that only Muslim Javanese military males could even be considered as candidates for the presidency, should also be abolished.
Thirdly, Indonesia's citizens and residents should have the right to be ruled by a civilian government, with maximum protection against the collusion between business (private) and public interests, a government which is accountable to the citizens through periodical elections as well as through unperiodical referenda in matters which effect the public welfare.
Conclusion
Finally, as a way of conclusion, allow me to paraphrase from Albert Memmi's classic (12), which I think it quite appropriate to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Indonesia's attempt to become an independent nation-state:
. . .colonization materially kills the colonized. It also kills him or her spiritually. Colonization distorts relationships, destroys or petrifies institutions, and corrupts men and women, both colonizers and colonized. To live, the colonized needs to do away with colonization. To become a man or woman, he or she must do away with the colonized being that he or she has become. If the European must annihilate the colonizer within himself or herself, the colonized must also rise above his or her colonized being.
So the question arises then: after fifty years, have we as Indonesians risen above our colonized being, or have we bcome colonizers ourselves ? Not only colonizers of another people who did not share the same historical heritage as us, but also as colonizers of our own peoples ?
Fremantle, August 15, 1995
Footnotes
(1) In fact, these are the legal instruments which the "New Order" is actually using more and more to crack down on dissidents from all walks of life in Indonesia, recently -- trade unionists, journalists, academics, etcetera.
(2) There is a strong pro-Java & Sumatra bias in the Anglophone Indonesian historiography, especially the focus on the era of the Indonesian modern independence struggle. One tends to forget, that the Makassarese of Gowa were only pacified, through the Bongaya treaty, in 1905. Apart from Eastern Indonesia, the independence struggle carried out in Kalimantan has also been overlooked by many Anglophone historians. This bias is probably caused by the fact that many of the East Indonesian and Kalimantan independence fighters, such as Kahar Muzakkar, Andi Mattalata, Sam Ratulangie and his daughter, Zus Ratulangie, and Tjilik Riwut, began their struggle from the bases in Java, due to the colonial centralistic state in Java, before eventually moving to their places of origin. The late Tjilik Riwut commanded the Air Force and Navy units which attacked the Dutch military posts in South and Central Kalimantan. because of his close connections with Sukarno, who was also an admirer of the Air Force, he was later appointed as the first governor of Central Kalimantan, one of the three Dayak governors before a series of Javanese governors ruled Central Kalimantan, until now.
(3) We should not forget that during the BPKI debates, some of the founding fathers of the Indonesian Republic also opted for a federalistic state, namely Mohammad Hatta and GSSJ (Sam) Ratulangie. They were overruled by the majority of the BPKI members, which were obviously so much obsessed with unity, that they feared federalistic state would certainly work in favour of the Dutch divide and rule tactics.
(4) Currently, democracy stirs have already become stronger in this Malay Muslim monarchy, which Azahari and his Partai Ra'yat Brunei wanted to reform in the early 1960s. However, PRB is still banned and recently its former executive secretary, Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, has been detained. Hence, another light needs to be put on this aborted revolution, instead of putting PRB -- and especially its former chairperson and founder, Azahari -- simply as a "puppet" of Sukarno's expansionistic dreams to take over the former British colonies of Northern Borneo. For a better picture of this aborted revolution and its aspirations, see Zaini Haji Ahmad's book, Partai Rakyat
